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In compliance with the socioeconomic theory, the study has strived to investigate the impact of economic and
non-economic public policies on tax evasion using panel data of 7 SAARC countries covering the period from 1998
to 2015. The study has applied the ordinary least square with fixed effect and random effect models to analyze the
data assembled. The result of the study implies that the higher the degree of economic freedoms, the lower the tax
evasion. More specifically, the government policies about property rights, monetary freedom, fiscal freedom and
investment freedom have a negative influence on taxpayers' choices of tax evasion while financial freedom result
shows a positive effect on tax evasion. Additionally, there is a negative impact of public sector governance and
religiosity on tax evasion, which implies the higher the public sector governance and the higher the religious faith
amid the people, the lower the degree of tax evasion. The findings of the study are supposed to offer the gov-
ernments, tax authorities, and research scholars the valuable insights into public policies for reducing the tax
evasion to a significant extent.1. Introduction
Tax evasion is a global phenomenon faced by almost all countries of
the world. Tax revenue is the most vital source of funding of a country for
its economic development, but tax evasion makes it quite challenging for
the tax authority for full and efficient collection of tax revenue from
taxpayers (Rashid, 2020; Siddiquee and Saleheen, 2020). Tax evasion is
viewed as the severe loss of government revenues that restrain the gov-
ernment from providing smooth public services due to the decline of the
state budget of public revenues (Androniceanu et al., 2019). Rashid
(2020) described tax evasion as an illegal act that breaches the law and
deviates from social norms to reduce one's tax liability. Mason et al.
(2020) claimed that firms are less intended to comply with tax laws if
they perceive an unfavorable impact on their government or an unfair
policymaking process. Androniceanu et al. (2019) found an interdepen-
dence between tax evasion and public policies and identified the degree
of economic, social, and cultural development as the main determinants
of tax evasion. So, it has become a debatable issue over the decades
among policymakers to find a better solution to tackle the growing
problem of tax evasion.. Rashid).
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vier Ltd. This is an open access arSouth Asia is sitting at the top of the economic growth, having an
average growth rate of 7–8 percent in the last 30 years, which is three
times or more than that of the EU economies and about twice the global
average. But the economy is characterized by a high level of corruption, a
low level of good governance, a high inflation rate, and an enormous tax
burden on the citizens. The large informal sector, weak economic base,
and incompetent tax collection and administration contribute to having a
historically lower percentage of tax to GDP in Emerging Market Econo-
mies (World Bank, 2019). Nevertheless, the SAARC countries have
struggled to increase their tax-to-GDP ratios over the last decade despite
ongoing tax reform. The low level of tax restricts the government's
capability to finance infrastructural and social development (Gupta,
2015). Moreover, research shows that the cause of lower tax to GDP ratio
is not only for the ineffective mobilization of tax revenue but also the
need for a different tax base (Gupta, 2015). So, the study has selected the
SAARC countries to identify an appropriate public policy to increase their
tax to GDP ratio in the future.
Many scholars have examined the impact of business freedom,
property right, culture, GDP, inflation, good governance, ethics, and so
forth on tax evasion (Nurunnabi, 2018; Zaman et al., 2019). Their studies
are limited either with the economic factors or with the non-economicmber 2020
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evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) cannot explain the
socio-behavioral dynamics (Gangl et al., 2015) without the presence of
the economic actors. Again, the policymakers in South Asian countries
are struggling to increase the tax to GDP ratio to keep sustaining their
growth potential in the future. Therefore, the study raises the following
research question. Do economic and non-economic public policies affect
tax evasion in SAARC countries, and if so, to what extent? For answering
the research question, the study investigates not only the influence of
economic factors but also non-economic public policies on tax evasion in
the business model to extend the area of investigation. These public
policies can be classified into three groups, specifically, economic
freedom, good governance, and religiosity as per the socioeconomic
theories. In several ways, this study would have contributed to the tax
literature. Firstly, the study extends the socioeconomic theory adding
economic freedoms, for instance, government spending, monetary
freedom, fiscal freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, and the
two major religions in this region - Islam and Hinduism. secondly, the
outcome of this research will guide the government and policymakers to
recognize the interrelationship between public policies and tax evasion
and allow them to take necessary steps towards the development of
policy frameworks for reducing tax evasion. Finally, the study provides
an essential summary of multiple data sources for future international tax
researchers and practitioners on the related issue.
2. Theory, literature review and hypotheses development
There are different theories of tax evasion pronouncing the country's
attitude towards non-taxpayers. The economic deterrence theory
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) states that tax evasion is a crime, and it is
committed by an individual when he considers the predicted benefits
from the crime are much higher than the costs of being caught. Legal
commitment based on the rule of law provides a suitable ground for the
government to prevent and punish tax evaders (Allingham and Sandmo,
1972; Schneider and Enste, 2000). The theory is endorsed by the finding
that there is a negative association between legal enforcement and tax
evasion (Becker, 2013). Feld and Frey (2007) developed the concept of a
psychological tax contract to establish a fair and reciprocal obligation
between government and taxpayers, where one party gives something,
and the other takes something - a quid pro quo situation. Based on this
theory, taxpayers feel discouraged to pay tax if they perceive the quality
of state institutions as low in general. Like the deterrence theory, this
theory also considers taxpayers as rational persons having extensive
knowledge of the costs and benefits of tax evasion. Smith and Smith
(2014) presented another theory called the theorem of moral sentiments
that implies religiosity acts as a type of internal moral force in paying
taxes. A study found that religious people have more moral sense (Mar-
quette, 2012) and religiosity keep people away from all evil-activities
and deter tax evasion.
Although the Allingham and Sandmo (1972)'s model of tax evasion
is crucial in explaining tax evasion's potential reasons, it is limited only
with the (institutional norm) legal enforcement by the tax authority
and it ignores the potential influence of taxpayers' personal belief and
country's economic freedom on tax-paying behaviour. Again, the
sentimental theory of tax evasion considers only one aspect (individual
norm) of tax evasion while other aspects (economic freedom and
institutional norm) are absent. On the other hand, the psychological
contract theory of tax evasion considers all the individuals as rational,
but the concept of rationality is ambiguous as it depends on multiple
factors. Considering the limitations of the existing theories of tax
evasion, Nurunnabi (2018) proposed a theory called the socioeconomic
theory describing tax evasion based on 'institutional infrastructure'
(Pickhardt and Prinz, 2014) shown in Figure 1. He considered tax
evasion as a complex process of multiple factors, including institutions,
entities, individuals, and individual's tax-paying behaviour. The theory
classifies economic and non-economic factors of tax evasion into three2
broad categories: taxpayers' behaviour, state structure, and the
behaviour of the tax authority. The hypotheses of the study have been
developed based on this theory.2.1. Economic freedoms
Economic freedom is a composite index of government integrity, legal
system and property rights, sound money, free trade, and regulation
(Bayar and €Oztürk, 2019). Miller et al. (2020) classified economic
freedom into four boards categorized viz. the rule of law, regulatory ef-
ficiency, open markets, and government size. It provides every human
with a fundamental right to manage his/her labor and property. In-
dividuals, in economically free societies, are free to work, create,
consume, and spend in whatever way they want (Kim and Holmes,
2016). Goel and Saunoris (2017) found that economic freedom reduces
the shadow economy in his analysis of 100 countries during 1990–2006.
Conducting a study of 42 countries across the four sub-Saharan Africa,
Alabede (2018) documented that the country with high economic
freedom tends to have higher tax revenue.
2.1.1. Property rights (the rule of law)
Property rights allow individuals to acquire private property freely.
More secured property rights fail to make equal distribution of resources
and reduce the potential ability of households to cope with exogenous
shocks, though it helps increase their openness to the economic mecha-
nism (Deininger and Jin, 2003). Effective enforcement of the rules of law
(secured property rights) is a source of strong support for the government
that acts against tax evasion. Prior studies evidenced that weaker
enforcement of the rule of law leads to a quick change in tax structure and
more tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Schneider and Enste,
2000; Richardson 2008). Similarly, the enforcement initiatives taken by
the government and tax authorities reduce tax evasion significantly
(Rashid, 2020). In line with prior studies, we propose the following
hypothesis:
H1a: The higher the property rights in a country, the less the possibility
of tax evasion.2.1.2. Fiscal freedom and monetary freedom (Regulatory efficiency)
Fiscal freedom signifies tax rates on corporate and individual earn-
ings. The tax rate determined by the fiscal policy is a percentage of the
accounting profit of the firms and individuals determined based on the
tax rules of a particular country (Adhikari et al., 2006). The government
fiscal policy also plays a vital role in determining taxpayers' perceived
behavior (Wu et al., 2007). Fisman and Wei (2004) found that tax
evasion is increased bymore than 3% for each 1% increase in the tax rate.
Other studies also found a positive correlation between the marginal tax
rate and tax evasion (Nurunnabi, 2018; Pappa et al., 2015). However, the
prior studies found a mixed relationship between tax evasion and mon-
etary freedom (inflation). Pappa et al. (2015) evidenced a long experi-
ence of both high inflation and low tax evasion. They argued that the
level of tax compliance falls when inflation progresses. But Nurunnabi
(2018) showed that with increased inflation, tax evasion decreased in
Muslim countries. Based on the above discussion, we can formulate the
following hypothesis.
H1b: The higher the tax rate (fiscal freedom) in a country, the higher
will be the tax evasion.
H1c: The lower the monetary freedom in a country, the higher will be
the tax evasion, all other things being equal.
2.1.3. Investment freedom and financial freedom (Open market)
Goel and Nelson (2005) found that economic openness matter more
than political openness in an economy, and among all the economic el-




Figure 1. The socioeconomic theoretical model of tax evasion.
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economic freedom might influence the decision-makers in using a stra-
tegic transit to choose between the costs and benefits of bribes (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1993). Therefore, a high level of economic freedom ensures
the high tax morale of the taxpayers. Moreover, the study of Alabede
(2018) found a significant positive impact of investment freedom as well
as the composite financial freedom on tax revenue performance. Pro-
tecting investors has a significant effect on their earnings management
(Fung et al., 2013); it may lead them to the choice of tax evasion plan-
ning. Accordingly, more investment with added financial freedom and
more entrepreneurial exercises help reduce tax evasion. Therefore, we
can propose the following hypotheses.
H1d: The higher will be the investment freedom in a country; the lower
will be the tax evasion.
H1e: The higher will be the financial freedom in a country; the lower
will be the tax evasion.
2.1.4. Government spending (Government size)
Theoretically, government spending as a measure of government size
(Li and Ma, 2015) may have either a positive or a negative impact on tax
evasion (Sritharan and Salawati, 2019). In the one hand, an increase in
government spending enhances administrative expenditure with
increased pressure on the fiscal budget, which may force the government
to raise tax rates and may lead taxpayers to evade tax (Li and Ma, 2015).
On the other hand, the government size denotes the state capacity
(Besley and Persson, 2009), and a government with strong state capacity
can uphold the rules of law and may lead to a decrease in tax evasion and
an increase in tax revenue. But in an empirical examination of the effect
of government size on tax evasion in China, Li and Ma (2015) revealed
that large government size is positively associated with more tax evasion
as it fails to bring a strong state capacity to enforce tax rules at the local
level.
H1f: The higher the government spending in a country, the higher/
lower will be the tax evasion.2.2. Public sector governance
Umar et al. (2019) adopted a conceptual approach to explain the
association between governance quality and individual tax compliance in3
the context of a developing country. They proposed that good governance
encourages people to recognize that the government works for their in-
terests, and its procedures are fair, which, in turn, will increase their trust
in government (Feld and Frey, 2002). Torgler and Schneider (2009)
stated that: If citizens perceive that their interests (choices) are
well-represented by political institutions, their willingness to act in the
hidden economy decreases. Eventually, the strong support of the poli-
cymakers on strict enforcement of governance codes engages citizens
emotionally and inspires them to show obedience and compliance with
tax laws. On the other hand, in an inefficient country where corruption is
widespread, the citizens hold little trust in government and thus a low
incentive to cooperate. Yamen et al. (2018) found a significant negative
association between governance indicators and tax evasion in EU coun-
tries. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: The higher the quality of a country's public sector governance
(institutional quality), the lower will be the tax evasion, all other things
being equal.2.3. Religious faith
Religiosity is a devotion to religion and the piety of an individual. It
does not allow tax evasion as it teaches righteousness and the right
people pay their tax to the state. Based on Islam, ‘Allah will penalize us if
we do not pay to the state’ (Jalili, 2012). In Islam, Zakah (tax/rates and
paying tax/rates) is the third pillar of faith, which is a compulsory pay-
ment for the people to fulfill the criteria for it. Similarly, based on Hindu
morals, taxes should be set and known to the taxpayers in terms of the
amount and time to pay so that it becomes easier for the collectors to levy
the appropriate tax for their benefits (Waldauer et al., 1996). Other re-
ligions also stress to pay a fixed amount to the state and show rational
behavior in this regard. Conducting a study on the impact of Shari'ah
regulation on tax evasion in the Muslim world, Nurunnabi (2018) found
that religiosity reduces tax evasion significantly. Similarly, Bose (2012)
found a significant association between the ethics of Hinduism and tax
evasion. Therefore, this study assumes that religious devotion will pro-
vide a better result for ensuring tax morale and tax compliance following
the actual role of religiosity (Pope and Mohdali, 2010).
H3: The higher the impact of religion (Islamism and Hinduism), the
lower will be the level of tax evasion, all other things being equal.
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3.1. Data
3.1.1. Sample size and data sources
The study collects a panel data set from 126 observations comprised
of 7 SAARC countries- Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka- for 18 years from 1998 to 2015 based on data
availability1. The inclusion criteria of individual countries in the study
were: (1) SAARC countries, and (2) data availability on tax evasion. The 8
SAARC countries were comprising 21% of the world's population, but
Afghanistan was excluded due to unavailability of tax evasion data. A
wide range of data sources, including the World Bank (1998–2015), The
Heritage Foundation (2015), World Economic Forum (2015), and indi-
vidual government's websites of selected countries, have been used in
this research.
3.1.2. Dependent variable
We have used the size of the shadow economy as a proxy for tax
evasion for the dependent variable (Yamen et al., 2018). This research is
based on the MIMIC model2 (Multiple Causes Multiple Indicators), a
shadow economy of macroeconomic measure. International Monetary
Fund (IMF) defines the shadow economy as:
The shadow economy is, by nature, difficult to measure, as agents
engaged in shadow economy activities try to remain undetected. The
extent of development of the shadow economy over time is driven by its
political and economic relevance. Moreover, total economic activities
with official and unofficial production of goods and services are required
to design economic policies that respond to changes and economic
development over time.
3.1.3. Independent variables
The study has used public policies as independent variables that
include both economic and non-economic factors. The economic factors
include all economic freedoms, while the non-economic factors recognize
public sector governance and two major religions, Islam and Hinduism
presented in Appendix A.
3.1.4. Control variables
A panel study needs to include a few variables as the control for the
social and economic differences of countries. For controlling the social
and economic differences, two control variables are included in the
model viz. unemployment rate (UNEM) and agricultural contribution
(AGR) as a percentage of GDP (Yamen et al., 2018). The higher the un-
employment rate and the higher the agricultural contribution of a
country, the higher the level of tax evasion. In an additional model, the
log of GDP has been included to confirm the robustness of our baseline
model.
3.2. Model specification
The main objective of this study is to analyze the relationship be-
tween public policies and tax evasion, whereas public policies include
both economic and non-economic factors. The study uses the following
model as the baseline–1 The latest data on tax evasion covered up to 2015 which was published by
International Monetary Fund in the title of “Shadow Economies Around the
World: What Did We Learn Over the Last 20 Years?” on January 2018.
2 This MIMIC model takes into account some factors such as tax burden, state
regulation burden, quality of state institutions, social security burden, tax
morale, unemployment rate and GDP per capita (Schneider et al., 2011), which
directly affects the dimensions of the shadow economy over time.
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TEit ¼α0 þ β1PRit þ β2PSGit þ β3MFit þ β4FFit þ β5IFit þ β6TRit þ β7GSit
þ β8MUSit þ β9HINit þ β10AGRit þ β11UNEMit þ Year dummyþ εit
(1)
where, TE ¼ tax evasion score; PR ¼ property rights score as a proxy of
legal enforcement; PSG ¼ public sector governance score; MF ¼ mone-
tary freedom as a factor of doing business; FF ¼ financial freedom; IF ¼
investment freedom; TR ¼ tax rate as proxy of fiscal freedom; GS ¼
government spending; MUS ¼ the percentage of Muslims; HIN ¼ the
percentage of Hindus; INF¼ inflation rate; AGR¼ the percentage of GDP;
UNEM ¼ the percentage of total labor forces; Year dummy ¼ 1 for the
respective year otherwise 0; εi ¼ error term; i¼ number of countries; t ¼
number of periods and α0 ¼ Intercept term; β1; β2; β3…::β11¼ slope co-
efficient of the variables.
Further, the study has run some additional models using alternative
variables to check the robustness of the baseline model. For instance,
instead of public sector governance, monetary freedom, and government
spending, the study used government integrity, inflation rate as a proxy
of monetary freedom, and tax revenue respectively. Moreover, taking the
financial crisis during 2008 into account, we have used a crisis dummy to
check whether it has a significant effect. Furthermore, we have run two
separate models considering before and after the crisis period.
3.3. Econometric methodology
3.3.1. Cross-sectional dependence test
Following the study of Le (2020), the present study run Pesaran
(2004) cross-sectional dependence test, a modified version of the LM test.
Since a cross-country investigation can interact with each other within
the economic-social network; it may lead them to a cross-sectional
dependence which in turn makes bias the estimation outcomes (Le,
2020). We recorded the presence of cross-sectional independence in our
study.
3.3.2. Panel unit root test
In the absence of cross-sectional dependence, further, we applied
first-generation panel unit root tests using Im Shin Pesaran (IPS) and
Levin-Lin Chu (LLC) (Im et al., 2003). We did not find the coefficient
value of some variables (Property rights, financial freedom, tax rate, and
religious faith) under the IPS unit root test due to a lack of required
observations. Again, we found the insignificance of some non-economic
variables including property rights, religiosity, and tax rate in both level
and first difference under the LLC unit test. Therefore, we conclude that
our model is static rather than dynamic over time.
3.3.3. Static models
Under the static model, three alternative linear estimation techniques
are available to handle panel data (Asteriou and Hall, 2007): (a) pooled
OLS method, (b) fixed-effect (FE) also known as the least square dummy
variable model, and (c) random effect (RE) model.
The pooled OLS method is also known as a common constant method
that estimates data under the chief assumption that there is no hetero-
geneity among the cross-sectional units; more specifically, this procedure
considers all cross-sectional units as a single unit. Thus the pooled OLS
technique assumes that there are no differences among the cross country
or individuals or firms within the panel data. This process estimates a
single constant “a” for all cross country.
On the other hand, the fixed-effect model introduces heterogeneity
among cross-sections through the constant of the regression function.
This approach provides a separate intercept for each cross-section and
this is called a one-way fixed-effect as it can capture only time-invariant
characteristics within the individual. It is very simple to transform a one-
way fixed-effect model into the two-way fixed-effect model. Hence, we
have to introduce only a time dummy as it captures all effects that will
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and fixed effect models can be specified in the following way:
Pooled OLS model:
Yit ¼ aþβ1 x1itþβ2 x2itþβ3x3itþβ4x4it þ uit (2)
Fixed effect model:
Yit ¼ aiþβ1 xitþβ2 x2itþβ3x3itþβ4x4it þ uit (3)
Another static type model is the random effect model though it has
similarity with the previous static model; this model has superiority over
the fixed-effect model as it is derived with fewer restrictions. The primary
dissimilarity between the fixed effect and random effect model is that the
latter considers the constants of the regression function for each cross
country as random parameters are not fixed. Therefore, the random effect
model addresses a cross-sectional effect to a greater extent as the dif-
ferences across the country are assumed as random and uncorrelated
with other dependent variables in the model. The random effect can be
shown in the following manner:
ai ¼ a þ vi (4)
where, vi is a standard normal variable with zero mean, and "a" is a
common intercept for all cross-sections.
3.3.4. Hausman test
Finally, the study runs the Hausman test to validate the suitable
method between FE and RE models (Hausman, 1978). It is also used to
compare the estimated coefficient of the FE from the RE model. The
hypothesis for the Hausman are-
Ho ¼ the suitable effect is random [i.e. consistent and efficient RE].
Ha ¼ the fixed effect is appropriate [i.e. inconsistent RE].
If the probability of the cross-sectional chi-square is more than the 5%
level, we do not reject the null hypothesis. It means the random effect
estimators would be proper to explain the model. In case of less than 5%
chi-square value, we reject the null hypothesis, which stands for using
fixed-effect estimators (Rashid et al., 2020).
3.3.5. Multicollinearity
The study is based on panel data, so it requires a test to assess mul-
ticollinearity. Multicollinearity arises when independent variables in a
regression model have a high degree of correlation. Having a collinearity
problem in the data set may affect the model that leads to distortion ofTable 1. Descriptive analysis.
Variable Obs. Mean
Tax evasion (TE) 126 31.46
Property right (PR) 126 39.33
Monetary freedom (MF) 126 72.18
Financial freedom (FF) 126 33.81
Investment freedom (IF) 126 35.28
Tax Rate (TR) 126 22.98
Government spending (GS) 126 70.17
Public sector governance (PSG) 126 -0.40
Muslim (MUS) 126 44.55
Hindu (HIN) 126 29.74
Government integrity (GI) 126 30.25
Inflation (INF) 126 6.71
Agriculture (AGR) 126 19.19
Unemployment (UNEM) 126 3.15
Tax revenue (TaxRev) 126 10.83
Gross domestic product (GDP) 126 1675.47
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the regression results. The problem of multicollinearity occurs when the
correlation coefficient between any two independent variables is above
the threshold of 0.80 (Farrar and Glauber, 1967). In addition, the study
deals with the variance inflation factor (VIF) test to validate whether the
model is collinear. According to Hair et al. (1984), no multicollinearity
exists in the model if the value of VIF of all variables is less than the
threshold value of 10. Since a model can be skewed by high collinearity,
we used both correlation coefficients between the variables and VIF to
deal with the collinearity issue.
3.3.6. Heteroskedasticity test
Heteroskedasticity occurs when the error variance has a non-constant
variance. With heteroskedasticity, we no longer have the “best” esti-
mator, because error variance is biased due to incorrect standard errors,
invalid t-statistics and F statistics. We have applied the Breusch-Pagan/
Cook-Weisberg test (Cook and Weisberg, 1983) to check hetero-
skedasticity as the adaptation of the Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and
Pagan, 1979) is less vulnerable to violations of the normality assumption.
Null and alternative hypotheses of this test are stated below:
Ho: the model is homoskedastic
Ha: the model is heteroskedastic
It is a chi-squared test: the test statistic is nχ2 with k degrees of
freedom. It tests the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. If the Chi-
Squared value is significant with a p-value below an appropriate
threshold (e.g. p < 0.05) then the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is
rejected and heteroskedasticity assumed and vice-versa. If a linear
regression contains heteroskedasticity, we can say that rather than a
uniform variance, the variance is influenced by one or more variables.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the data of sampled
countries. From 1998 to 2015, the dependent variable (tax evasion)
shows an average of 31.46% of GDP, a range of 17.89%–48.85%, and a
standard deviation of 7.31%. The study shows that the average level of
tax evasion in the SAARC region is quite high (31.46%) from the view-
point of the world economy. It also indicates a significant variation in tax
evasion across the countries over the study period. There are consider-
able variations in the independent variables too. The inflationary situa-

















A. Islam et al. Heliyon 6 (2020) e0544919.56%with a mean rate of 6.71%. The factors of economic freedom also
vary significantly among SAARC countries. The public sector governance,
which indicates the efficiency of the countries in implementing the rules
of law, is low among the SAARC countries with a mean score of -0.40.
Among all main religions in the South Asia region, Islam is at the top with
a mean value of 44.55%, while the mean score of Hinduism 29.74%.
Agriculture contributes one-fifth of the GDP. It shows an average
contribution of 19.19% of the GDP to a country.
4.2. Pearson correlation
Table 2 represents the correlations among the variables. Among
economic freedom, tax rate, government spending, investment freedom,
and financial freedom are positively correlated with tax evasion, while
property right is negatively related. Similarly, among the religions, the
Hindu is negatively correlated, while the Muslim is negatively and
insignificantly correlated. Moreover, unemployment and agriculture
show a positive correlation with tax evasion.
4.3. Multicollinearity test
To identify the collinearity problem, we estimate the Pearson pair-
wise correlation among the independent variables. The finding of our
correlation test is presented in Table 2. The highest degree of correlation,
as estimated in our data set, is between Muslim and property rights
(-0.73), which is still far below our threshold of 0.8 (Farrar and Glauber,
1967). Therefore, the results indicate that the data is free from the
multicollinearity problem. Further, the study has applied VIF to confirm
whether the multicollinearity exists in the model presented in Table 3.
Since all the values of VIF are below the threshold of 10 (Hair et al.,
1984); there is no collinearity problem in this study.
4.4. Heteroskedasticity
In our study, the chi-square value was small (0.10) and the p-value of
chi-square is 0.748, indicating heteroskedasticity is not a problem in the
OLS model of our study.
4.5. Regression analysis
We present the results of the regression analysis in Table 3 to test our
hypotheses. We have applied the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) andTable 2. Pairwise correlations for dependent and independent variables.
TE PR PSG IF
TE 1.00
PR -0.15* 1.00
PSG -0.09 0.51*** 1.00
IF 0.17* -0.10 0.00 1.00
MF 0.08 -0.05 0.09 0.01
FF 0.40*** 0.16* 0.21** 0.41***
TR 0.20** 0.20** 0.06 0.46***
GS 0.36*** -0.01 -0.45*** 0.18**
MUS -0.11 -0.73*** -0.38*** 0.31***
HIN -0.17* 0.28*** -0.04 -0.25**
UNEM 0.42*** 0.12 0.36*** 0.19**






*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
6
generalized least squares (GLS) of both fixed and random effect
approaches.
First, the study found a negative and significant impact of property
rights on tax evasion upholding the hypothesis H1a. The finding implies
that the higher the rule of law in a country, the lower the level of tax
evasion. Next, both fiscal freedom, monetary freedom, and investment
freedom are negatively related to tax evasion supporting the hypothesis
H1b, H1c, and H1d. On the other hand, our result did not confirm the
H1e and H1f as financial freedom found positively significant, while
government spending has an insignificant effect on tax evasion. Finally,
the study documented a statistically significant negative relationship
between public sector governance and religiosity (both Muslim and
Hindu) on tax evasion; the results support hypothesis H2 and H3. In the
case of the control variables, the regression coefficient of both agriculture
and unemployment is positive and highly significant under all the
models. Thus we can conclude that a higher unemployment rate and a
higher level of agriculture lead to higher tax evasion across the SAARC
countries.
4.6. Fixed effect, random effect and Hausman test
We have further explored the fixed effect and the random effect
models. Among all the results, fiscal freedom (tax rate), economic
freedom, government spending, public sector governance, and religiosity
have significant impacts on tax evasion that support our hypothesis under
both the models. On the contrary, investment and monetary freedoms
have an insignificant impact on tax evasion under these models. The
property right shows a mixed result. It discloses a negative and signifi-
cant effect on tax evasion under the RE model but an insignificant impact
under the FE model. However, to choose an efficient estimator between
fixed and random effects, we have conducted another test named the
Hausman test. The result discloses that the p-value for the chi-square
statistic is (Prob > chi2 ¼ 0.000) less than 5%, which means to reject
the Hο of the test (Rashid et al., 2020). Thus there is no evidence that the
fixed-effect model is inconsistent. So, the appropriate model seems to be
the fixed-effect model that is efficient and consistent to explain the
variables.
4.7. Additional tests
Further, the study has run some separate models using alternative




-0.27*** 0.13 0.41*** 1.00
0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.27***
* -0.01 -0.16* -0.01 0.34***
-0.14 0.25*** 0.42*** -0.02




Table 3. Regression results (OLS, random, and fixed effect) on tax evasion.
Variables VIF OLS FE RE
Property rights (PR) 4.07 -0.488*** 0.040 -0.410***
(0.041) (0.037) (0.056)
Investment freedom (IF) 1.98 -0.101*** -0.011 0.018
(0.030) (0.017) (0.038)
Monetary freedom (MF) 1.38 -0.158** 0.154*** 0.164*
(0.071) (0.036) (0.086)
Financial freedom (FF) 1.81 0.219*** -0.075** 0.141***
(0.040) (0.029) (0.055)
Tax rate (TR) 4.33 0.172** 0.305*** 0.321***
(0.072) (0.054) (0.098)
Government spending (GS) 6.44 -0.020 -0.055** -0.087***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.031)
Public sector governance (PSG) 2.85 -3.748*** -0.945* -3.931***
(0.771) (0.487) (1.050)
Muslim (MUS) 9.57 -0.183*** -6.743*** -0.171***
(0.018) (1.375) (0.025)
Hindu (HIN) 4.09 -0.165*** -4.852*** -0.178***
(0.016) (1.174) (0.022)
Unemployment (UNEM) 2.16 1.185*** -0.101 1.515***
(0.201) (0.164) (0.275)
Agriculture (AGR) 5.02 0.276*** 0.559*** 0.613***
(0.079) (0.077) (0.095)
Year dummy Yes
_cons 61.772*** 452.431*** 23.756***
(6.822) (95.792) (7.892)




Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
A. Islam et al. Heliyon 6 (2020) e05449Table 4, we have alternated the monetary freedom with inflation rate as
the proxy of the country's financial freedom in line with the study of
Nurunnabi (2018), we have found a positive relationship between
inflation and tax evasion. The result implies that the higher the inflation
and lower the monetary freedom, the higher the tax evasion. The finding
is consistent with our baseline model, where we found high monetary
freedom and low tax evasion. All other results in this model are similar to
the baseline model. In column 2, we have used tax revenue as an alter-
native to government size rather than government spending. We found a
positive relationship between tax revenue and tax evasion, but all other
results remain consistent with the baseline model. In column 3, we have
used government integrity as an alternative variable of public sector
governance. We found a negative impact of government integrity on tax
evasion, which is similar to the baseline model. In this model, all other
results are also unchanged. In column 4 of Table 4, we added lGDP as an
additional variable. We found an insignificant effect of lGDP on tax
evasion, whereas all other results remain the same. Thus our outcomes
are robust because all the models produce similar results.
Further, crisis dummy (CD)3 has been added in column 5 of Table 4 to
check whether the crisis period during 2008 has a significant impact on
the overall results. The study found a significant negative influence of CD3 As the study conducts a cross-country investigation with both economic and
non-economic factors, we have used crisis dummy to deal with the possible
effect of the global financial crisis during 2008. We have divided the study
period into two groups before the crisis and after the crisis and used dummy as
0 for before crisis (1998–2007) and 1 for after crisis (2008–2015).
7
on tax evasion. Therefore, we run two separate models. Columns 6 and 7
present the outcomes of before and after the crisis to investigate the
impact of different public policies on tax evasion. The study found almost
similar results in the before crisis (BC) model except for the insignificant
effects of investment freedom and monetary freedom. Similarly, under
the model of after crisis period, all other findings are similar except for
the insignificant effect of tax rate and monetary freedom. However,
under both before and after crisis models, government spending has a
negative and statistically significant impact on tax evasion.
5. Discussions
South Asian countries have experienced a low tax to GDP ratio despite
a strong growth trajectory during the last decade. These economics are
characterized by a high rate of corruption and population growth as
against low per capita income and weak legal enforcement, social secu-
rity, and quality of life with an unfriendly environment for building
alternative socio-economic organizations and systems for improved so-
cial welfare and environmental protection. All these have inspired the
authors to lead this research. The study found a significant relationship
between economic freedom and tax evasion in this region. Amid the
determinants of economic freedom, we have seen the property right has a
significant negative impact on tax evasion under all the models. So, all
South Asian countries need to support the effective enforcement of laws
to prevent tax evasion. This finding is in line with the prior studies of
Deininger and Jin (2003) and Nurunnabi (2018). Applying OLS regres-
sion we have witnessed a significant negative impact of both the fiscal
and monetary freedom on tax evasion, which suggests higher fiscal and
Table 4. Additional tests.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS-CD OLS-BC OLS-AC
PR -0.490*** -0.469*** -0.394*** -0.486*** -0.488*** -0.394*** -0.311***
(0.041) (0.037) (0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.062) (0.058)
PSG -3.551*** -3.751*** -3.757*** -3.748*** -4.157*** -18.275***
(0.771) (0.656) (0.775) (0.771) (0.944) (2.369)
IF -0.110*** -0.082*** -0.131*** -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.081 -0.041*
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.050) (0.023)
MF -0.211*** -0.157** -0.158** -0.072 -0.014
(0.072) (0.072) (0.071) (0.115) (0.096)
FF 0.207*** 0.183*** 0.193*** 0.227*** 0.219*** 0.075 0.136**
(0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.048) (0.040) (0.067) (0.055)
TR 0.168** 0.116** 0.181** 0.163** 0.172** 0.327** 0.072
(0.072) (0.053) (0.070) (0.079) (0.072) (0.135) (0.080)
GS -0.005 0.004 -0.025 -0.020 -0.087* -0.065***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.030) (0.024) (0.044) (0.016)
MUS -0.181*** -0.178*** -0.188*** -0.185*** -0.183*** -0.130*** -0.280***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.031) (0.014)
HIN -0.161*** -0.163*** -0.200*** -0.168*** -0.165*** -0.150*** -0.198***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.024) (0.012)
UNEM 1.100*** 1.101*** 0.812*** 1.181*** 1.185*** 1.949*** 0.972***
(0.205) (0.195) (0.199) (0.202) (0.201) (0.306) (0.292)
AGR 0.199** 0.245*** 0.196** 0.244* 0.276*** 0.535*** 0.002











Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
_cons 50.724*** 62.489*** 57.491*** 66.392*** 61.772*** 47.680*** 45.688***
(3.365) (6.520) (3.578) (16.857) (6.822) (10.984) (8.968)
N 126 126 126 126 126 70 56
F 32.863 35.328 34.906 30.969 32.661 18.238 84.611
r2 0.875 0.883 0.882 0.875 0.875 0.874 0.972
r2_adj. 0.849 0.858 0.856 0.846 0.848 0.826 0.961
Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
CD ¼ Crisis Dummy, BC ¼ Before Crisis and AC ¼ After Crisis.
A. Islam et al. Heliyon 6 (2020) e05449monetary freedom would lower the level of tax evasion. A higher tax rate
(financial freedom) increases tax evasion to a significant extent (Andro-
niceanu et al., 2019; Pappa et al., 2015). Likewise, the link between high
monetary freedom and low tax evasion also recommends high monetary
freedom. More specifically, the inflation rate needs to be reduced as we
documented tax evasion goes up due to the high inflation rate; the
finding is harmonious with the study of Nurunnabi (2018). The result
implies that people look reluctant to pay taxes with an increased tax rate
and inflation. Hence, policymakers should be sagacious while changing
the tax rate and managing inflation in the economy. Also, the study has
investigated the impact of two components of open market freedom viz.
investment freedom and financial freedom on tax evasion. Investment
freedom shows a significant and negative effect on tax evasion that8
implies that investment can create possibilities for entrepreneurs through
enhancing economic development, improving productivity, and gener-
ating more employment (Alabede, 2018). Concomitantly, a significant
and positive effect of financial freedom on tax evasion that implies more
autonomy for banks and non-bank financial institutions may increase tax
evasion. Hence, the study proposes that policymakers should promote a
capital market that is free from all sorts of manipulations and ensure a
considerable degree of control over the money market (banks and
non-bank financial institutions) that will reduce tax evasion significantly.
Though the study did not record any significant result of government size
in the baseline model, the study found a negative and significant effect on
tax evasion in the models of before and after financial crises. It indicates
an association between a high level of government spending and a low
A. Islam et al. Heliyon 6 (2020) e05449level of tax evasion. Hence, proper state spending has a significant impact
on the tax evasion behavior of taxpayers. The public accepts the tax
authority as legitimate when the taxation system is fair, and only then the
government spending is beneficial and effective in controlling tax
evasion (Alasfour, 2019). Moreover, public sector governance has a sig-
nificant and negative impact on tax evasion under all the models; the
result is compatible with the prior studies (Feld and Frey, 2002; Torgler
and Schneider, 2009; Yamen et al., 2018). The finding is more robust
when used government integrity in place of public sector governance as
we found similar results. When the government and its administrative
organs encourage accountability, political stability, management effi-
ciency, governance quality, rules of law, and curb corruption, then
people believe their government is sincerely protecting their interests.
So, if a country has good governance in the public sector, there must be a
lower level of tax evasion. This situation suggests that good governance
can improve people's trust in the governance mechanisms, which drives
them to pay more tax. Finally, the study examined the impact of religions
on tax evasion. Both Islam and Hinduism have a negative effect on tax
evasion under all models supporting the results of Torgler and Schneider
(2009). Based on our coefficient estimation, the study found the higher
the religious faith of the people, the lower the tax evasion. As religiosity
has a positive effect on daily life (Nazaruddin et al., 2018), our study
corroborates the finding of Torgler (2006) that religious faith has a high
impact on the tax morale of taxpayers that, in turn, influence their tax
compliance. Hence, the findings suggest religiosity and experiences of
citizens of a country shape the social norms, and an established religious
practice discourages all atypical human behavior that, in turn, reduces
the level of tax evasion.
However, the study has several limitations. Firstly, it has reviewed
only the SAARC countries, so the findings of this study are not enough to
generalize for all the economies, particularly for the developed eco-
nomics. Secondly, out of the twelve factors of economic freedom, we
have examined only six. Future studies may analyze business freedom,
trade freedom, judicial effectiveness, fiscal health as relevant in this re-
gard. Thirdly, we have considered public sector governance as an average
of six WGI in line with the study of Nurunnabi (2018), that may not
represent the impact of all the indicators on tax evasion. Fourthly, some
values of the correlation coefficient and VIF in our study are high and
could potentially create multicollinearity problem; these results are due
to the limitations of economic freedom and WGIs data since they have
large standard errors and construct validity (Thomas, 2010; Yamen et al.,
2018). Thus readers must be cautious in interpreting our results. Finally,
the religiosity of a country is a source of taxpayers' ethical character
though culture and socio-economic systems help develop their values.
We have not studied those factors. Thus in light of the limitations, future
researchers may include all moral as well as institutional factors in their
model. Such inclusive researchmay provide robust results in determining
the factors influencing tax evasion.
6. Conclusion
The interplay between public policy and tax evasion has attracted
academic researchers, think tanks, and policymakers in many countries.
Nevertheless, there is a scarcity of research on this important issue using
the SAARC context that causes this study. Findings of the study have
provided some new insights into the administrative policies for tax
collection, surveillance of legal compliance by tax regulatory officials,
drafting of a legal framework by lawmakers, and efforts to collect tax
revenue by tax officials of the respective SAARC country. These could
help design an appropriate taxation system for reducing tax evasion and
thereby raising the government tax revenue. The study also offers the
following policy implications for successful tax planning. Firstly, the
government should ensure an economic environment having a higher
level of property right, higher fiscal freedom (lower tax rate), higher
monetary freedom (lower inflation), and higher investment freedomwith
the controlled financial freedom to motivate citizens to make more9
contributions to the state exchequer in the form of tax revenue arising
from low tax evasion. Second, the study finds that public sector gover-
nance as an institutional norm plays an influential role in curbing tax
evasion. The SARRC countries should give importance to the use of
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) as these reduce the level of tax
evasion. Finally, the study suggests that the governments of the SAARC
countries should stress more on practicing religious activities as it keeps
people disassociated from all atypical forms of human behavior and also
motivate them to evade tax.
To sum up, the study provides governments and policymakers with a
clear understanding of the critical variables associated with tax evasion
globally. Governments and tax authorities can address tax evasion
problems and increase tax revenue by developing and implementing
excellent strategies at the right time in the right place. The study also
contributes some new insights into the existing knowledge of taxation
and tax evasion to help extend the socioeconomic theory. The study
findings will encourage researchers and tax practitioners interested in an
in-depth study on useful tax forecasting, planning, and controlling in
future. Moreover, exploring some other economic and non-economic
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